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Abstract 
Recent studies of visual search suggest that learning about valued outcomes (rewards and 
punishments) influences the likelihood that distractors will capture spatial attention and slow 
search for a target, even when those value-related distractors have never themselves been 
the targets of search. In the current study we demonstrate a related effect in the context of 
temporal, rather than spatial, selection. Participants were presented with a temporal stream 
of pictures in a fixed, central location, and had to identify the orientation of a rotated target 
picture. Response accuracy was reduced if the rotated target was preceded by a ‘valued’ 
distractor picture that signalled that a correct response to the target would be rewarded (and 
an incorrect response punished), relative to a distractor picture that did not signal reward or 
punishment. This effect of signal-value on response accuracy was short-lived, being most 
prominent with a short lag between distractor and target. Impairment caused by a valued 
distractor was observed if participants were explicitly instructed regarding its relation to 
reward/punishment (Experiments 1, 3 and 4), or if they could learn this relationship only via 
trial-by-trial experience (Experiment 2). These findings show that the influence of signal-
value on attentional capture extends to temporal selection, and demonstrate that value-
related distractors can interfere with conscious perception of subsequent target information. 
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A traditional and influential view of attention distinguishes between two different types of 
attentional control: one that is volitional and goal-directed (top-down control) and another 
that is automatic and stimulus-driven, based on the physical features of stimuli (Corbetta & 
Shulman, 2002; Yantis, 2000). A recent body of research, however, has made a case for a third 
category of influence on attentional selection that is neither goal-directed nor stimulus-
driven. Specifically, this research has shown that attention is influenced by what we have 
previously learned about stimuli, particularly in terms of how they relate to rewards and 
punishments, which we term learned value (for recent reviews, see Anderson, 2016; Awh, 
Belopolsky & Theeuwes, 2012; Le Pelley, Mitchell, Beesley, George & Wills, 2016). Notably, 
many of these studies have shown an influence of learned value on attentional capture that 
operates independently of both the physical features of stimuli and an observer’s goals, 
suggesting that capture can be modulated by previous experience. 
Most of the research on learned value has examined its effect on spatial selection, 
typically using visual search procedures. For example, in one study (Le Pelley, Pearson, 
Griffiths & Beesley, 2015), participants had to move their eyes as quickly as possible to a 
diamond-shaped target among circles on each trial. A distractor circle could appear in either 
a high-value colour or a low-value colour (red or blue, counterbalanced); all other stimuli 
were grey. On trials with a distractor circle in the high-value colour, rapid saccades to the 
diamond earned a large reward. On trials with a low-value distractor, rapid saccades to the 
diamond earned a small reward. Thus while the distractor predicted reward value, it was 
never the stimulus to which people were required to respond (or direct their attention) to 
obtain that reward. Crucially, if at any point participants looked at the distractor circle, the 
reward on that trial was cancelled; these were termed omission trials. So attending to the 
distractor was counterproductive to participants’ goal of maximizing their payoff; in 
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particular, looking at a high-value distractor was most counterproductive since it resulted in 
loss of a high-value reward. Nevertheless, high-value distractors produced significantly more 
omission trials than did low-value distractors. That is, people were more likely to look at 
high-value distractors than low-value distractors, even though doing so lost them the large 
reward that they would otherwise have obtained. The implication is that learning that a 
stimulus signals a high-value reward increases the likelihood that it will automatically capture 
spatial attention, independently of its physical salience. This effect has been termed value-
modulated attentional capture (Pearson, Donkin, Tran, Most & Le Pelley, 2015; Pearson et al., 
2016).1 
Other studies using visual search have shown that the influence of learned value on 
attentional capture is not restricted to the effect of reward – stimuli associated with high 
punishment (e.g., large loss of money, or electric shock) are also more likely to capture 
spatial attention than stimuli associated with lower or no punishment (e.g., small loss of 
money, or no shock: Wang, Yu & Zhou, 2013; Wentura, Müller & Rothermund, 2014). These 
findings suggest that the crucial determinant of value-modulated attentional capture is the 
motivational significance of the outcome that is signalled by a stimulus, rather than the 
prospect of reward per se. 
However, spatial attention is only one aspect of attentional selection. We can also 
prioritise detection of events that will occur in a known location; e.g., an impatient driver at 
an intersection knows where the green light will appear, but not when. The problem here is 
one of temporal selection. While the spatial studies described above suggest that value-
related distractors can slow down spatial selection of a target stimulus, studies using 
temporal selection tasks suggest that value-related stimuli can interfere with people’s 
conscious perception of a target, i.e., their awareness of whether a target was presented at all, 
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even when the target was the focus of spatial attention (e.g., Della Libera & Chelazzi, 2009; 
Failing & Theeuwes, 2015; Most & Wang, 2011; O'Brien & Raymond, 2012; Raymond & 
O'Brien, 2009; Smith, Most, Newsome & Zald, 2006: for a systematic review, see Le Pelley et 
al., 2016). 
Of particular interest are studies of temporal selection in which attention to the critical, 
reward-related stimuli was assessed while they acted as task-irrelevant distractors, since 
under these conditions it is unlikely that attentional prioritisation reflects the operation of 
explicit goal-directed processes (Della Libera & Chelazzi, 2009; Failing & Theeuwes, 2015; 
Smith et al., 2006). Studies have found that graphic pictures with positive or negative 
emotional content spontaneously impair perception of subsequent targets in a rapid serial 
visual presentation (RSVP) detection task (e.g., Most, Chun, Widders & Zald, 2005; Most, 
Laurenceau, Graber, Belcher & Smith, 2010; Most, Smith, Cooter, Levy & Zald, 2007; Wang, 
Kennedy & Most, 2012), and similar effects seem to arise in the wake of distractors that have 
accrued value through learning. In one study by Failing and Theeuwes (2015), each trial of an 
initial phase presented two pictures from different semantic categories (e.g., forests and 
mountains) side-by-side. Participants had to choose one of the pictures: choice of a picture 
from one category typically yielded a large reward, choosing the other typically yielded a 
small reward. Participants learned these relationships, becoming more likely to choose 
pictures from the high-reward category. Following this training came a test phase, which 
used an RSVP task. On each trial, a stream of pictures appeared rapidly (100 ms per picture) 
in the centre of the screen. Participants’ task was to detect a target picture belonging to a 
category that had never been rewarded during training (e.g., a field). The key finding was 
that target detection was significantly poorer if the target was shortly preceded by a 
distractor picture from the high-reward category than a picture from the low-reward 
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category. This suggests that high-reward pictures were more likely to capture attention and 
hence reduce perceptual processing of a subsequent target. This capture effect could not be 
attributed to shifts of spatial attention, since all stimuli (distractors and targets) were 
presented centrally, at the focus of participants’ spatial attention. Following Folk, Leber and 
Egeth (2008), we refer to this erroneous temporal selection of a task-irrelevant stimulus as 
nonspatial attentional capture. 
This finding is consistent with the idea that learned value modulates temporal, as well 
as spatial, attentional capture. An important caveat, however, is that the difference in reward 
history of the different categories during the test phase of Failing and Theeuwes’s (2015) 
study was confounded with a difference in their selection history: pictures from the high-
reward category were selected more frequently as targets during the training phase, and it 
may be this greater selection history (as opposed to learned value) that drives greater 
capture by these pictures in the test phase (cf. Kyllingsbaek, Schneider & Bundesen, 2001: 
see Awh et al., 2012; Le Pelley et al., 2016). 
In a related study using aversive outcomes (Smith et al., 2006), participants experienced 
an initial training phase in which a single picture was presented on each trial. Pictures 
belonging to a particular category (e.g., birds) were consistently paired with delivery of an 
aversive loud noise; pictures belonging to another category (e.g., cars) were never paired 
with the noise. When these pictures were subsequently used as distractors in an RSVP task, 
responses to the target were significantly less accurate when it was preceded by a picture 
from the noise-paired category. This finding is again consistent with the idea that learned 
value (here with regard to an aversive event) influences nonspatial attentional capture. 
However, a caveat is also necessary here. Rather than reflecting a change in the attention-
grabbing properties of the noise-paired picture, the increased distraction caused by this 
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picture may reflect participants’ expectation of the noise itself.  That is, perhaps the noise-
paired stimulus does not capture attention, but instead elicits some sort of strategic, 
preparatory response to protect against the aversive outcome which results in 
disengagement from the RSVP task. Notably, Smith et al. continued to deliver occasional 
picture–noise pairings during the RSVP test phase, in order to maintain participants’ 
expectancy of an aversive outcome. 
So we have two studies using RSVP tasks to measure changes in nonspatial attentional 
capture by value-related distractors, but in both cases the interpretation is somewhat 
equivocal. Both of these studies used a ‘training phase – test phase’ procedure (see also 
Della Libera & Chelazzi, 2009): in an initial training phase, the value-related stimuli were task-
relevant—in effect they were the targets that participants needed to identify (in order to 
obtain reward or prepare for punishment)—and the subsequent test phase assessed the 
extent to which these stimuli continued to capture attention when they were task-irrelevant 
distractors. Le Pelley et al. (2015, 2016) noted that, under these conditions, the capture by 
value-related stimuli observed during the test phase may reflect a carryover of a conditioned 
attentional response that is automatically re-enacted whenever the relevant conditioned 
stimulus appears, i.e., an ‘attentional habit’ (see also Anderson, 2016; Luque et al., 2017). We 
can contrast this with the situation in Le Pelley et al.’s (2015) visual search task, described 
earlier, where the reward-related stimuli were only ever presented as distractors. Under these 
conditions, the influence of learned value on attentional capture cannot reflect a carryover of 
a conditioned attentional orienting response; it suggests that value-modulated attentional 
capture is a function of the value of the outcome that is signalled by a stimulus, rather than 
the value of responding to that stimulus. 
The current experiments used a related approach to investigate value-modulated 
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attentional capture in the context of temporal, rather than spatial, selection. We used an 
RSVP task in which the critical value-related stimuli were only ever presented as distractors, 
to investigate whether differences in the learned signal value of stimuli can influence 
temporal selection. In Experiment 1 participants were explicitly informed at the outset 
regarding the relationship between the distractors and the possibility of reward (or 
punishment). In Experiment 2 participants could learn this relationship only through trial-by-
trial experience. Within the RSVP task, we varied the delay between distractor and target 
(referred to as lag) in order to investigate the temporal characteristics of attentional capture 
by the value-related distractor: either 200, 400, or 1000 ms separated the onset of the 
distractor and target. The shortest lag (200 ms) provides an index of the early impact of the 
distractor; at the longest lag (1000 ms), the target occurs outside what would typically be 
considered the window of nonspatial attentional capture (Folk et al., 2002; Raymond et al., 
1992). The intermediate lag (400 ms) provides a proxy measure of rate of recovery from 
capture by a salient distractor. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants.  Previous studies of value-modulated capture of spatial attention by 
task-irrelevant distractors (Failing et al., 2015; Le Pelley et al., 2015; Pearson et al., 2015, 2016) 
have found medium to very large effect sizes (Cohen’s dz = .41 to 2.2). We therefore ran each 
of Experiments 1-3 for as many days as required to test 44 participants, which would yield a 
power of .90 to detect a medium effect size of dz = .5. In total, 52 UNSW Sydney students 
(mean age = 22.0 years; 33 females) participated in Experiment 1, either for course credit (n 
= 38) or for payment of $15 AUD (n = 14). All participants received an additional monetary 
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bonus dependent on their performance (M = $11.11 AUD, SEM = $0.10 AUD). All research 
reported in this article was approved by the Human Research Ethics Advisory Panel 
(Psychology) of UNSW Sydney. 
Apparatus and stimuli.  Participants were tested individually, and viewed stimuli on a 
23-inch monitor (1920 × 1080 resolution, 120 Hz refresh) positioned ~60 cm from the 
participant. Auditory stimuli were played over headphones, and all responses were made 
using the keyboard. Stimulus presentation was controlled by MATLAB using Psychophysics 
Toolbox extensions (Kleiner, Brainard & Pelli, 2007). 
Visual stimuli were colour photographs presented centrally on a black background; 
pictures subtended 8.1° × 6.1° visual angle. Target pictures were drawn from a pool of 244 
landscape/architectural pictures, half of which had been rotated 90° to the left and the other 
half 90° to the right (while maintaining the same dimensions as the nonrotated pictures). 
Critical distractors (see Design) were 10 pictures of birds, and 10 pictures of cars. Filler items 
were drawn from a pool of 251 upright landscape/architectural pictures. 
Design.  Unlike previous studies of value-modulated attentional capture in nonspatial 
attention (Della Libera & Chelazzi, 2009; Failing & Theeuwes, 2015; Smith et al., 2006), the 
current study did not use separate training and test phases. Instead the experiment involved 
only a single phase, using an RSVP task (Figure 1a). On each trial, a stream of 18 pictures was 
presented for 100 ms each. Each stream contained one rotated target picture; once all items 
in the stream had been presented, participants responded according to whether they 
thought the target picture was rotated left or right, using the left and right arrow keys 
respectively. Feedback was then provided for 900 ms, depending on the type of distractor 
that had preceded the target and the accuracy of the participant’s response (see below).  
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The experiment had three trial-types: valued, neutral and baseline trials. For half of 
participants, pictures of birds were the valued distractors, and pictures of cars were neutral 
distractors; for remaining participants, this was reversed. On valued and neutral trials, the 
critical distractor was drawn randomly from the appropriate pool of pictures (birds or cars). 
On baseline trials the RSVP stream did not contain a bird or a car; instead an 
architectural/landscape picture drawn from the same pool as the filler items was used in 
place of a critical distractor. 
On valued trials, a correct response to the orientation of the target yielded reward 
feedback: the message “CORRECT: WIN 50 POINTS!!” appeared centrally in green, 42-point 
text, accompanied by a rising-pitch, ‘victory’ sound. An incorrect response to the target on 
valued trials yielded loss feedback: the message “ERROR: LOSE 50 POINTS” in red, 42-point 
text, accompanied by a buzzer. Consequently distractors from the valued category signalled 
the potential for both reward and loss, but critically they were never the stimuli that 
participants responded to in order to obtain valued outcomes: from the participant’s 
perspective, they were task-irrelevant throughout the experiment (we consider the issue of 
task-irrelevance in more detail in Experiment 3). On neutral and baseline trials, feedback 
simply displayed either “correct” or “incorrect” (as appropriate) in white, 40-point text, with 
no gain or loss of points. Hence neutral distractors were never paired with valued outcomes. 
The distractor (or additional filler item on baseline trials) appeared randomly as the 
third, fourth, fifth, or sixth item in the stream. The target appeared either as the second item 
(Lag 2), the fourth item (Lag 4), or the tenth item (Lag 10) after the distractor; thus either 200 
ms, 400 ms, or 1000 ms separated the onset of the distractor and target. One-third of trials 
for each distractor type (valued, neutral and baseline) in every block were at each of the 
different lags. Even though baseline trials did not feature a critical distractor, controlling ‘lag’ 
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on these trials in the same way as for valued and neutral trials is important since it controls 
for the serial position of the target in the RSVP stream; the target will tend to occur later on 
long-lag trials than short-lag trials. 
Non-distractor and non-target items in the RSVP stream on each trial were drawn 
randomly, and without replacement, from the pool of filler items. The target item was drawn 
randomly from the pool of target pictures, such that target rotation (left or right) was 
random on each trial. 
Procedure.  The experiment began with a short 6-trial practice session, with RSVP 
rates starting at 5 pictures per second and increasing to the experiment presentation rate of 
10 pictures per second. The practice session did not include distractors, and no points were 
won or lost. 
Following practice, participants were informed that they could now win points for 
correct responses, that the number of points they earned would determine their monetary 
bonus at the end of the experiment, and that most participants could earn between $8 and 
$12 AUD (no specific information on the conversion rate from points to money was 
provided). They were also explicitly informed that if the stream included a picture of a 
[bird/car] (whichever was the valued distractor for that participant), they would win 50 points 
for making a correct response to the target and lose 50 points for an incorrect response, and 
that on all other trials they would not win points for correct responses or lose them for 
incorrect responses. Finally, participants were told that the bird/car would never be the 
target stimulus, so they would do better at the task by trying to ignore it. 
Participants then began the main experiment, which comprised 14 blocks of 45 trials. 
Each block contained 18 valued trials, 18 neutral trials, and 9 baseline trials. The inter-trial 
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interval was 500 ms. Participants took a short break after each block, during which they were 
told their running total of points. At the end of the experiment participants received a bonus 
based on their final points total, calculated as bonus (AUD) = 8 + (points – 3780) / 1890, and 
capped at $12.10 AUD. 
Finally, participants completed three questionnaires: the Attentional Control Scale 
(Derryberry & Reed, 2002), the BIS/BAS scales (Carver & White, 1994), and the Barratt 
Impulsiveness Scale Version 11 (Patton, Stanford & Barratt, 1995). Analyses relating to data 
from these questionnaires were inconclusive and are not pursued further here, but for the 
sake of completeness are discussed further in the accompanying Supplementary Materials. 
Results 
Data from all experiments reported in this article are publically available via the Open 
Science Framework at https://osf.io/xm845/. 
Figure 1b shows accuracy of responses to the target, averaged across all blocks. These 
data were analysed using a 3 (distractor: valued, neutral, and baseline) × 3 (lag: lag 2, lag 4 
and lag 10) analysis of variance (ANOVA). This revealed significant main effects of distractor, 
F(2,102) = 49.9, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .49, and lag, F(2,102) = 46.2, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .48, and a 
significant interaction, F(4,204) = 60.0, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .54. The simple effect of lag was 
significant for each type of distractor, F(2,102) = 5.00, p < .008, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .09. For valued and 
neutral distractors, this effect reflected an increase in accuracy as lag increased; for baseline 
trials, it reflected a decrease in accuracy as lag increased. 
Planned pairwise t-tests were used to analyse the effect of distractor at each lag. At lag 
2, accuracy was significantly lower for valued trials than neutral trials or baseline trials, t(51) = 
10.0, p < .001, dz = 1.39, and accuracy was lower for neutral trials than baseline trials, t(51) = 
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3.50, p < .001, dz = .48. At lag 4, there was a trend towards lower accuracy for valued trials 
than neutral trials, t(51) = 1.77, p = .082, dz = .25. Accuracy on baseline trials did not differ 
significantly from valued trials, t(51) = 1.60, p = .115, dz = .22, or neutral trials, t < 1. At lag 
10, accuracy on valued trials and neutral trials did not differ significantly, t < 1. However, 
accuracy was significantly higher on valued and neutral trials than on baseline trials, t(51) = 
2.27, p = .027, dz = .31. 
We were particularly interested in the difference in accuracy on valued versus neutral 
trials: these both featured a critical distractor (bird or car), with the only difference being that 
one category of distractor had high learned value while the other did not. We therefore 
analysed the data from these trial types using a 2 (distractor: valued vs. neutral) × 3 (lag) 
ANOVA. This revealed significant main effects of distractor and lag, F(1,51) = 76.2, p < .001, 
𝜂𝑝
2 = .60. Most importantly, there was a significant distractor × lag interaction, F(2,102) = 
60.1, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .54, with Figure 1b showing that the pattern of lower accuracy on valued 
trials than neutral trials was particularly pronounced at short lag and decreased as lag 
increased. 
Discussion 
The key finding of Experiment 1 was that accuracy of responding to the target was 
significantly lower when the target was preceded by a valued distractor than a neutral 
distractor. This is noteworthy, because it means that accuracy was lower on trials which 
influenced participants’ final monetary payment than on trials that ‘didn’t matter’, i.e. trials 
on which the response could have no effect on payment. This impairment in accuracy caused 
by the presence of a valued distractor was short-lived, being particularly pronounced at short 
lag but absent at the longest lag tested. 
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The implication is that the valued distractor was more likely to capture attention and 
hence reduce perceptual processing of the target. That is, a stimulus signalling the potential 
for reward or loss produced a greater impairment in conscious perception of the target than 
did a stimulus that had never been paired with reward or loss. This shows that learned value 
can influence capture of nonspatial attention, even when the value-related stimulus has 
never been a task-relevant target. 
While value-related distractors produced the greatest impairment in performance, 
accuracy was also significantly lower on neutral trials than baseline trials at the shortest lag. 
That is, identification of the target was impaired when it was shortly preceded by a critical 
distractor (i.e., a picture that was categorically distinct from the other items in the RSVP 
stream) even when that distractor did not indicate availability of reward, as compared to 
when the stream did not contain a critical distractor. This impairment caused by neutral 
distractors is most likely a consequence of their physical features; perhaps their categorical 
distinctiveness from other items in the stream drives occasional capture by these distractors 
(Kennedy & Most, 2015a), or perhaps their pictorial properties (colour, brightness etc) are 
such as to cause a short-lived interference with target perception. 
On baseline trials, accuracy decreased as ‘lag’ increased. Since no critical distractor was 
presented on baseline trials, the lag variable here corresponds to the serial position of the 
target in the RSVP stream: the longer the lag, the later the target tended to occur in the 
stream. The decrease in accuracy with lag on baseline trials may therefore reflect a decline in 
vigilance for the target over the course of each stream. The finding that, at the longest 
distractor–target lag (1000 ms), accuracy was significantly higher for trials with a critical 
distractor (either valued or neutral) than baseline trials in turn suggests that the occurrence 
of a distractor relatively early in the stream acts to reduce this longer-term decline in 
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vigilance. However, the learned value of the distractor had no effect on accuracy at the 
longest lag; we return to this issue in the General Discussion. 
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 1, participants were explicitly informed of the relationship between the 
valued distractor and the potential for reward / loss at the outset. In Experiment 2 we 
investigated whether a similar effect of learned value could be observed in the absence of 
such explicit instruction, i.e., when learning of reward relationships must be based on trial-
by-trial experience. 
Method 
Participants.  Fifty-three UNSW Sydney students (mean age = 20.1 years; 27 females) 
participated for course credit; they also received a monetary bonus dependent on 
performance (M = $11.14 AUD, SEM = $0.14 AUD).  
Apparatus, stimuli and design.  Apparatus, stimuli and design of the RSVP task were 
as in Experiment 1. 
Procedure.  The procedure for the RSVP task was as for Experiment 1, except that 
initial instructions did not inform participants that one category of distractor (birds or cars) 
signalled that points could be won or lost. Instead they were simply told that on some trials 
they could win/lose points for correct/incorrect responses, while on other trials they would 
not win or lose points, and they would not be told before each trial whether it was one on 
which they could win points or not. Participants completed 18 blocks of 45 trials each; this 
was slightly longer than Experiment 1 (14 blocks), since we thought it might take some time 
for participants to learn the relationship between the valued distractor and the outcome 
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values that it signalled. 
Despite this opportunity for contingency learning, some participants may not have 
learned the distractor–value association. As a step towards identifying such ‘non-learners’, 
following the RSVP task all participants completed a learning test. They were told that, during 
the previous task, certain pictures that had appeared in the stream of images had signalled 
whether they could win or lose points for correct or incorrect responses, and other pictures 
signalled that they could not win or lose points on that trial. Participants were then shown 
each of the 10 bird and 10 car distractors in random order. For each picture they were asked 
whether, if they made a correct response for a stream containing that picture, they would 
receive no points, or would win 50 points. Participants made their choice by clicking on the 
appropriate on-screen button using the mouse. They then rated their confidence in that 
choice, from 1 (‘not at all confident’) to 5 (‘very confident’). 
At the end of the experiment participants’ bonus was calculated as bonus (AUD) = 8 + 
(points – 4860) / 2430, and capped at $12.10 AUD. 
Results 
Figure 1c shows response accuracy averaged across all participants. A 3 (distractor) × 3 (lag) 
ANOVA revealed main effects of distractor, F(2,104) = 15.8, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .23,  and lag, 
F(2,104) = 21.9, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .30, and a significant interaction, F(4,208) = 10.6, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 
.17. The simple effect of lag was significant for valued and neutral trials, F(2,104) > 18.7, p < 
.001, 𝜂𝑝
2 > .26, with higher accuracy at longer lags. There was no significant effect of lag for 
baseline trials, F < 1, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .002. Pairwise t-tests were used to analyse the effect of distractor 
at each lag. At lag 2, accuracy was highest for baseline trials: valued vs baseline, t(52) = 6.79, 
p < .001, dz = .93; neutral vs baseline, t(52) = 5.79, p < .001, dz = .80. While there was a 
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numerical trend towards lower accuracy for valued trials than neutral trials, this difference did 
not reach significance, t(52) = 1.39, p = .17, dz = .19. At lag 4 and lag 10, no pairwise 
comparisons were significant, ts < 1.52, ps > .13, dzs < .21. 
So while the lag 2 data showed that distinctive distractors (a bird or a car among 
architectural/landscape pictures) impaired response accuracy, across all participants there 
was little evidence of an influence of learned value on accuracy, i.e., a difference between 
valued and neutral distractors. However, as noted earlier, it is possible that some participants 
failed to learn the relationship between the valued distractor category and the potential to 
win or lose points. Responses from the learning test were used to identify non-learners. 
Following Pearson et al. (2015), if a participant correctly responded that a picture from the 
valued category signalled the potential to win points, their contingency belief score for that 
picture was given by multiplying their confidence rating by 1; if they incorrectly stated that it 
did not signal potential for reward, their confidence rating was multiplied by -1. Contingency 
belief scores were averaged across all 10 pictures from the valued category, giving a mean 
score that ranged from 5 (high confidence that valued pictures signalled potential for 
reward) to -5 (high confidence that valued pictures did not signal potential for reward). 
Across participants mean contingency belief score was near zero (M = -0.48, SEM = 
0.24), indicating that many participants did not learn the relationship between the valued 
distractor and valued outcomes. Nevertheless, a subset of participants had positive 
contingency belief scores, suggesting they may have learned that the value of the valued 
distractors. As a conservative measure, we labelled any participant with a mean contingency 
belief score greater than zero as a learner (n = 22), and those with scores of zero or below as 
non-learners (n = 31).2 
Analyses of RSVP data from learners and non-learners focussed on lag 2, since this was 
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where the most pronounced effect of learned value was observed in Experiment 1. Figure 1d 
shows accuracy for lag 2 trials separately for learners and non-learners. Non-learners were 
less accurate on trials featuring a critical distractor than on baseline trials, but showed no 
effect of learned value (no difference between trials with a valued versus neutral distractor). 
In contrast, learners showed evidence of an effect of learned value, with lower accuracy for 
valued trials than neutral trials. Statistical support for a difference in the effect of learned 
value between the two subgroups came from a 2 (subgroup: learners vs non-learners) × 2 
(distractor: valued vs neutral) analysis of covariance (ANCOVA), controlling for participants’ 
picture assignment condition (birds as valued distractor vs cars as valued distractor). This 
covariate was included because the two counterbalance conditions were not equally 
represented in the two subgroups (64% of non-learners were in the ‘birds valued’ condition, 
while only 32% of learners were in this condition). This ANCOVA revealed a significant main 
effect of distractor, F(1,50) = 4.024, p = .050, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .074,3 but no main effect of subgroup, 
F(1,50) = .05, p = .82, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .001. Importantly, the subgroup × distractor interaction was 
significant, F(1,50) = 4.21, p = .046, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .078, indicating a significant difference in the effect 
of learned value in learners versus non-learners. This interaction does not rely on inclusion of 
picture assignment condition as a covariate, remaining significant if the covariate is omitted, 
F(1,51) = 6.26, p = .016 , 𝜂𝑝
2 = .11. 
The effect of distractor for each subgroup was analysed further using one-way 
ANCOVAs to compare pairs of distractor types while controlling for picture assignment 
condition. For learners, accuracy was significantly lower for trials featuring a critical distractor 
than those with no distractor: valued vs baseline, F(1,20) = 18.9, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .49; neutral vs 
baseline, F(1,20) = 5.66, p = .027, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .22. Critically, accuracy was significantly lower for 
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valued trials than neutral trials, F(1,20) = 6.18, p = .022, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .24, revealing an effect of 
learned value among the subgroup of learners. For non-learners, accuracy was significantly 
lower for trials featuring a critical distractor than those with no distractor: valued vs baseline, 
F(1,29) = 5.74, p = .023, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .17; neutral vs baseline, F(1,29) = 4.75, p = .038, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .14. 
However, for these non-learners there was no significant effect of learned value: valued vs 
neutral, F(1,29) = .16, p = .69, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .006. None of the results of these pairwise comparisons 
relies on inclusion of picture assignment condition as a covariate; the pattern of significant 
results is unchanged if this covariate is omitted. 
An alternative analysis treats contingency belief scores as a continuous variable. For 
each participant, we calculated a learned value score for lag 2 trials by subtracting accuracy 
on valued trials from accuracy on neutral trials (so high scores indicate a greater impairment 
caused by the valued distractor). There was a significant positive correlation between this 
learned value score and participants’ contingency belief scores (Figure 1e), both as bivariate 
correlation, Pearson’s r(51) = .343, p = .012, and when controlling for picture assignment 
condition, r(50) = .295, p = .034. 
Discussion 
In Experiment 2, participants were not explicitly informed of the relationship between the 
valued distractor category and the potential to win/lose points, but instead could learn this 
relationship incidentally through trial-by-trial experience. Across all participants, this 
incidental learning was rather weak – the majority of participants did not seem to have 
learned the status of the valued distractor (as revealed by a judgment test following the 
RSVP task). Presumably as a result of this weak learning, there was little evidence of an 
influence of learned value on RSVP task performance when averaged over all participants. 
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However, the subset of participants who did show evidence of learning also exhibited a 
significant influence of learned value on RSVP task performance, which was similar in nature 
to that seen following explicit instruction in Experiment 1. That is, for short distractor–target 
lag, valued distractors produced a significantly greater impairment in accuracy than neutral 
distractors. 
As in Experiment 1, accuracy was lower on neutral trials (i.e., trials with a critical 
distractor that did not signal reward) than on baseline trials (no critical distractor). This 
difference was significant in both learners and non-learners in Experiment 2. The finding of 
an effect for non-learners—that is, participants who showed no evidence of having learned 
the relation between the valued distractor and the potential for reward/loss—suggests that 
the impairment produced by the distractor does not reflect a generalization of value-
modulated capture from the valued distractor (a possibility raised in the Discussion of 
Experiment 1). Instead this finding implies that the impairment caused by neutral distractors 
is a consequence of the physical features of these distractors, independent of any effect of 
reward learning. 
Finally, Experiment 2 did not replicate the reduction in accuracy with increasing ‘lag’ on 
baseline trials that was observed in Experiment 1, or the advantage for critical distractor trials 
over baseline trials at Lag 10. While the reason for this null result is unclear, we note that 
overall accuracy on baseline trials was somewhat lower in Experiment 2 (M = 90.4%, SEM = 
1.08%) than in Experiment 1 (M = 92.8%, SEM = .80%), and this difference approached 
significance, t(103) = 1.82, p = .072, d = .36. This could be taken to suggest that, for some 
reason (either due a difference in the participant sample, or to the procedural differences 
between experiments), target vigilance was generally at a lower level in Experiment 2, rather 
than being reduced as a function of position in the RSVP stream. 
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Experiment 3 
In Experiments 1 and 2, the value-related stimuli (birds/cars) were never the rotated 
target pictures that participants were required to identify on each trial. Hence participants 
could complete the task without ever needing to select these value-related stimuli; in fact, 
attentional selection of the bird/car on each trial would typically make the task harder, by 
impairing identification of a target following shortly afterwards. This impairment in target 
identification caused by value-related stimuli is clear in the data of Experiments 1 and 2 for 
short lags (particularly lag 2), where accuracy was lower for trials containing a distractor than 
for baseline trials. Given that participants never needed to identify the value-related stimuli 
to perform the task, and doing so generally impaired task performance, it could be argued 
that these stimuli constituted task-irrelevant distractors. It is (in part) on the basis of this 
task-irrelevance that we have argued, up to this point, that the impairment in accuracy 
caused by value-related distractors reflects involuntary attentional capture by these stimuli. 
However, while the value-related stimuli are unrelated to the response that participants 
must make on each trial, they do provide information on the consequences of that response: 
they predict whether the response will result in reward or not. As such, the value-related 
stimuli have informational value (see Gottlieb, Hayhoe, Hikosaka & Rangel, 2014). This raises 
the possibility that participants may attempt to use the value-related stimuli strategically, to 
identify which trials will be rewarded. In fact, this is a poor strategy to use, since (as noted 
above) attending to the value-related stimuli in this task tends to reduce participants’ 
monetary benefit; they would actually maximize their overall payoff by ignoring these stimuli 
altogether. However, participants may nevertheless believe that they ought to use the value-
related stimuli in a goal-directed fashion, to identify trials that will be rewarded. 
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Experiment 3 tested whether the influence of value-related stimuli on accuracy at short 
distractor–target lags reflected participants’ strategic selection of reward-informative 
distractors, or whether instead it resulted from a relatively early and involuntary capture of 
nonspatial attention. The procedure was based on that of Experiment 1, but with two key 
differences. 
The first difference was that in Experiment 3 we went to greater lengths to clarify to 
participants that the optimal strategy to maximize their payoff was to ignore the bird/car on 
each trial. In Experiment 1 participants were informed that the bird/car would never be the 
rotated target stimulus and that they should try to ignore it; in Experiment 3 this instruction 
was expanded to explain why participants ought to ignore the value-related stimuli (see 
Procedure below). If the influence of value-related distractors on accuracy were to persist 
despite these clear instructions, this would support the claim that this influence is not 
mediated by strategic, goal-directed selection of the distractor, but instead reflected a more 
automatic process of attentional capture. 
The second, and perhaps more important, change in Experiment 3 was that we 
included a final extinction phase. In this final phase, participants were informed that they 
could no longer win or lose points on any trial; other than this, the task then carried on as 
before. If selection of value-related stimuli in the earlier, rewarded phase reflected a strategic 
process of information-gathering, then it should be abolished in this extinction phase. This is 
because participants already know that no reward is available on each trial, so the 
(previously) value-related distractors no longer provide any information. If, in contrast, 
selection of the valued distractor were involuntary and based on its history of association 
with reward/loss, the selection of this distractor may persist even when participants are 
explicitly aware that rewards are no longer available. 
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Finally, Experiment 3 included trials on which the rotated target followed immediately 
after the value-related distractor (i.e., a Lag 1 condition). These trials allowed us to further 
probe the temporal dynamics of the effect observed in our previous experiments, by 
establishing whether reward-related distractors cause an impairment in target identification 
even when there are no intervening items in the RSVP stream. An alternative possibility is 
that the distracting effects of reward-related stimuli might be reduced when they 
immediately precede the target; this pattern is sometimes observed in studies of the closely 
related attentional blink phenomenon, where it is known as Lag-1 sparing (Dell'Acqua, Pierre, 
Pascali & Pluchino, 2007; Raymond, Shapiro & Arnell, 1992; Visser, Bischof & Di Lollo, 1999). 
Method 
Participants.  Forty-four UNSW Sydney students (mean age = 19.1 years; 36 females) 
participated for course credit; they also received a monetary bonus dependent on 
performance (M = $9.83 AUD, SEM = $0.10 AUD).  
Apparatus, stimuli and design.  Apparatus and stimuli were as for Experiment 1. The 
design of the RSVP task was similar to Experiment 1. The main differences were that: (1) each 
RSVP trial now contained 12 pictures, and (2) the rotated target appeared as the first (Lag 1), 
second (Lag 2) or fourth (Lag 4) item after the distractor (or additional filler item on baseline 
trials); thus either 100ms, 200ms, or 400ms separated the onset of the distractor and target. 
Procedure.  As in Experiment 1, instructions following the brief initial practice phase 
informed participants that if the stream included a picture of a [bird/car] (whichever was the 
valued distractor for that participant), they would win 50 points for making a correct 
response to the target and lose 50 points for an incorrect response, and that if the stream 
contained a [car/bird] (whichever was the neutral distractor) they would not win points for 
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correct responses or lose them for incorrect responses. It was then explained to participants 
that the bird or car would never be the rotated target. To illustrate this, they were shown an 
example sequence of pictures in which a bird or car preceded the target by two positions 
(i.e., Lag 2). They were then told that: “In fact, you will do better at this task (you will earn 
more points, and therefore more money) if you IGNORE the bird/car altogether. Sometimes 
the target will be presented shortly after the bird/car: you will find that if you are paying 
attention to the bird/car, you will often miss the target that follows it. The best strategy in 
this task is to ignore the bird/car completely and just try to identify the target as accurately 
as possible on each trial. On average you will win around $5 to $6 more if you use this 
strategy. The bird/car is just there to distract you and make the task harder!”. These 
instructions were clarified by the experimenter with reference to the example of the Lag-2 
sequence shown on-screen, to ensure that all participants understood that they would earn 
points by responding to the target, and not to the bird/car, so that the best strategy was to 
ignore the bird/car altogether. 
The rewarded phase then began. This comprised 12 blocks of 45 trials, which were 
structured exactly as for blocks in Experiment 1 (though the three lags used were now Lag 1, 
Lag 2, and Lag 4 rather than Lag 2, Lag 4, and Lag 10). Feedback on each trial was exactly as 
in Experiment 1. 
On completing the rewarded phase, the following message appeared in yellow, 48-
point font: “FROM NOW ON, YOU WILL NOT BE ABLE TO WIN OR LOSE ANY POINTS IN THIS 
TASK, REGARDLESS OF THE PICTURES PRESENTED IN THE STREAM.  Nevertheless, you 
should carry on responding to the rotated target as accurately as you can on each trial”. This 
message remained on-screen for at least 12 seconds. The extinction phase then began. This 
comprised 2 blocks of 45 trials, structured as for the reward phase, the only difference being 
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that feedback on every trial was restricted to either “correct” or “incorrect”; feedback no 
longer referred to points won or lost, and all auditory feedback was omitted. During the 
break between the two trial blocks, participants were reminded that they would not be able 
to win or lose any points in the next block. 
At the end of the experiment, participants received a bonus based on how many points 
they had earned during the rewarded phase, calculated so that correct responses on 100% of 
valued trials in this phase gave a bonus of $12 AUD, and 50% accuracy (i.e., chance 
performance) gave a bonus of $6. 
Results 
Figure 2 shows accuracy of responses to the target, averaged across all blocks of each phase. 
A 2 (phase: rewarded, extinction) × 3 (distractor: valued, neutral, baseline) × 3 (lag: Lag 1, Lag 
2, Lag 4) ANOVA revealed significant main effects of distractor, F(2,86) = 56.9, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = 
.57, and lag, F(2,86) = 56.3, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .57, and a distractor × lag interaction, F(4,172) = 
24.8, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .37. Phase did not exert a significant main effect or interact with any 
other factor(s), Fs < 1.40, ps > .23, 𝜂𝑝
2 < .03. This suggests that participants’ performance in 
the task did not critically depend on whether rewards/punishments were currently available 
(in the rewarded phase) or not (in the extinction phase). 
In order to examine the more specific question of whether the effect of learned value 
differed between phases, we repeated this ANOVA but omitted data from baseline trials; i.e. 
the distractor factor now compared valued and neutral trials, which (across participants) 
differed only in terms of the learned value of the distractor. The main effect of distractor was 
significant, F(1,43) = 26.9, p < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .38, with lower accuracy on valued trials than neutral 
trials, demonstrating an influence of learned value. The magnitude of this effect of learned 
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value depended on lag, with a significant distractor × lag interaction, F(2,86) = 11.9, p < .001, 
𝜂𝑝
2 = .22. Once again, however, phase did not have a main effect or interact with any other 
factor(s), Fs < 2.46, ps > .09, 𝜂𝑝
2 < .055. That is, the effect of learned value did not differ 
significantly between the rewarded and extinction phases. 
Planned t-tests were used to analyse the effect of learned distractor value at each lag. 
In the rewarded phase, accuracy on valued trials was significantly lower than on neutral trials 
at Lag 1, t(43) = 3.70, p < .001, dz = .56, and Lag 2, t(43) = 10.1, p < .001, dz = 1.53, but not at 
Lag 4, t < 1. In the extinction phase, accuracy on valued trials was significantly lower than on 
neutral trials at Lag 2, t(43) = 4.98, p < .001, dz = .75, but not at Lag 1, t < 1, or Lag 4, t(43) = 
1.13, p = .26, dz = .17. While the effect of learned value at Lag 1 was significant in the 
rewarded phase but not the extinction phase, the size of this effect (given by accuracy on 
neutral trials minus valued trials) did not differ significantly between the two phases, t(43) = 
1.41, p = .17, dz = .21. 
Discussion 
Experiment 3 replicated the influence of learned value on accuracy of responding to the 
target at short distractor–target lags that was observed in Experiments 1 and 2: once again, 
accuracy was lower when the target was shortly preceded by a valued distractor than when it 
was preceded by a neutral distractor. Notably, this counterproductive effect of learned value 
was observed even though we went to pains in Experiment 3 to explain to participants that 
deliberately attending to the distractors was a poor strategy since it would result in a 
reduced payoff. Indeed, during informal debriefing after the experiment, most participants 
complained of being unable to help seeing the distractors despite their best efforts. 
Perhaps most importantly, the effect of learned distractor value persisted during the 
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extinction phase, when participants were explicitly informed that they could no longer win or 
lose points on any trial. Hence during this extinction phase, the critical distractors no longer 
carried any information regarding reward availability. The persistence of an influence of 
learned value under these conditions suggests that attention to value-related distractors 
does not reflect a strategic search for information in this procedure, but instead reflects 
involuntary attentional capture driven by past experience of the relationship between 
distractors and valued outcomes. 
Finally, during the rewarded phase of Experiment 3 we observed a significant effect of 
learned value on performance at Lag 1, i.e., when 100 ms separated the onset of distractor 
and target, and there were no intervening items. Thus the impairment in target detection 
caused by the presence of a reward-related distractor was not subject to Lag-1 sparing. This 
performance impairment at Lag 1 is similar to that previously reported for the case in which 
distractors have intrinsic emotion-related content (e.g., pictures of violence or threat: 
Kennedy & Most, 2015b). 
Experiment 4 
Experiment 3 demonstrated an influence of learned distractor value on response 
accuracy during an extinction phase when participants were fully aware that no rewards 
would be delivered, and hence the distractors carried no strategically useful information. We 
have argued above that this suggests that the influence of distractors during the extinction 
phase is not mediated by a strategic search for information regarding reward availability. 
There is an alternative possibility, however. The distractors did provide valid information on 
reward availability during the (rather long) rewarded phase that preceded the extinction 
phase. It is possible that participants developed a strategy of attending to the distractors 
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during the rewarded phase, and then persisted in using this strategy during the extinction 
phase even though it was no longer necessary (or indeed useful) during this latter period. 
This possibility is interesting in its own right, since it suggests that strategic attentional 
responses can persist to influence behaviour even when participants are aware that these 
responses are no longer appropriate and will only impair performance; in effect, this account 
proposes that strategic attentional responses can become ‘attentional habits’ (cf. Anderson, 
2016; Luque et al., 2017). However, it is still somewhat different from our claim that reward 
can induce biases in temporal attention that are not under strategic control; i.e., that reward 
can produce capture of non-spatial attention. 
Experiment 4 provided a final, stringent test of this latter claim of non-strategic 
capture. In this experiment, prior to every RSVP trial participants were explicitly and validly 
informed of whether reward would be available on that trial, in a pre-trial instruction display. 
Each RSVP stream also contained a distractor from a category that was typically, but not 
always, associated with availability of reward, or from a category that was typically associated 
with lack of reward. Under these conditions, the critical distractors were entirely redundant 
from a strategic perspective throughout the experiment: they carried no additional 
information on reward availability, and were in fact less valid as predictors of reward than 
was the pre-instruction. Consequently there was no reason for participants to strategically 
allocate attention to these distractors at any point. 
We were interested in whether the reward-related distractors would nevertheless 
capture attention and impair target detection in the RSVP task. Unlike in previous 
experiments, distractor categories were not perfectly correlated with reward (non)availability 
in Experiment 4: 80% of reward-available trials featured a valued distractor and 20% featured 
a neutral distractor; 80% of reward-unavailable trials featured a neutral distractor and 20% 
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featured a valued distractor. This allowed us to examine the influence of distractors on 
performance independently of any effect of the pre-instruction regarding reward availability. 
Method 
Participants.  Sixty-two UNSW Sydney students participated, either for course credit (n 
= 30) or for payment of $15 AUD (n = 32). All participants also received a monetary bonus 
dependent on performance. Following exclusions (see Results), the final sample contained 46 
participants (37 females; age M = 22.6, SEM = 1.1 years; performance bonus M = $10.52 AUD, 
SEM = $0.10 AUD). 
Apparatus, stimuli and design.  Apparatus and stimuli were as for Experiment 1. The 
design of the RSVP task was similar to Experiment 1, with certain key differences. Each RSVP 
stream was now preceded by an instruction display that stated, with 100% validity, whether 
the upcoming trial would be a reward trial or a non-reward trial (Figure 3a). This instruction 
display consisted of a white rectangle outline of the same size as the RSVP pictures, 
presented centrally, and containing the text ‘REWARD trial’ (in yellow) or ‘non-reward trial’ (in 
white) as appropriate, in 48-point font. 
Participants completed 18 blocks of 20 trials, each comprising 10 reward trials and 10 
non-reward trials. Of the 10 reward trials in each block, 8 featured a distractor from the 
valued category distractor (birds or cars, counterbalanced over participants), and 2 featured a 
distractor from the neutral distractor category (cars or birds, as appropriate). Of the 10 non-
reward trials in each block, 8 featured a neutral distractor and 2 featured a valued distractor. 
Note that, in Experiment 4, the terms ‘valued’ and ‘neutral’ with regard to distractors refer to 
probabilistic rather than deterministic relationships: valued distractors now signalled the 
availability of a valued outcome (reward/punishment) with 80% validity, and neutral 
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distractors signalled the absence of reward/punishment with 80% validity. 
Experiments 1-3 showed that the cost of attending to the valued distractor was 
greatest at Lag 2 (i.e., when 200 ms separated the onset of distractor and target). In order to 
create a situation in which strategic selection of the distractor was most disadvantageous, we 
therefore used Lag 2 for all trials in Experiment 4. Finally, there were no baseline trials (that is, 
trials with no distractor); these trials do not relate directly to the central issue of how reward 
affects performance, and removing them allowed us to include more of the critical trial types. 
Procedure.  Instructions following the brief initial practice phase were similar to those 
of Experiment 3. Participants were informed that if the stream included a picture of a 
[bird/car] (whichever was the valued distractor for that participant), it would typically be a 
‘reward trial’, on which they would win or lose points for making a correct or incorrect 
response to the target; if the stream included a [car/bird] (neutral distractor) it would 
typically be a ‘non-reward trial’, on which they would not win or lose points regardless of 
their response. The word ‘typically’ was inserted in these instructions in Experiment 4 to 
reflect the fact that valued/neutral distractors signalled reward/non-reward trials with only 
80% validity. As in Experiment 3, participants were shown an example sequence of pictures in 
which a bird or car preceded the target by two positions (i.e., Lag 2), to illustrate that the 
bird/car would never be the rotated target, and were informed that “The bird/car is just there 
to distract you and make the task harder”. Finally, participants were told that an instruction 
display immediately before each trial would reveal whether the upcoming trial would be a 
reward trial or a non-reward trial. 
Each trial began with an instruction display shown for 1500 ms (see Figure 3a), 
indicated by a grey ‘countdown’ bar positioned just below the instruction which gradually 
disappeared over this interval. The screen then blanked, and after 800ms the RSVP stream 
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began. All other procedural aspects of the RSVP task were as for Experiment 1. 
Following the RSVP task we included a manipulation check to ensure that participants 
had understood the initial instructions about the reward relationships in the task. The 
question ‘Which type of picture was more likely to appear in the stream of images on 
REWARD TRIALS (i.e., trials on which you could win or lose points)?', appeared above the 
options ‘BIRD’ and ‘CAR’. Participants were told that they would receive an additional 500 
points for answering this question correctly. 
Results 
Sixteen participants answered the manipulation check question incorrectly: despite explicit 
instruction and extensive experience over the course of the RSVP task, these participants 
incorrectly identified the distractor category that was more likely to appear on reward trials. 
Data from these participants were excluded; analyses below relate to the remaining 46 
participants, though we note that the pattern of significant and non-significant findings is 
unaffected by this exclusion. 
Figure 3b shows accuracy of responses to the target, as a function of whether the 
instruction display pre-informed participants that the trial would be a reward trial or a non-
reward trial, and whether the RSVP stream contained a valued distractor or a neutral 
distractor. These data were analysed using a 2 (instruction: reward, non-reward) × 2 
(distractor: valued, neutral) ANOVA. This revealed a significant main effect of instruction 
F(1,45) = 5.65, p = .022, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .11, with higher accuracy when participants were instructed that 
reward would be available on the upcoming trial. Critically, there was also a main effect of 
distractor, F(1,45) = 7.20, p = .010, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .14, with lower accuracy on trials with a valued 
distractor than trials with a neutral distractor. There was no significant interaction, F(1,45) = 
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1.67, p = .20, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .04. 
Discussion 
Accuracy was higher in Experiment 4 when participants were pre-warned that their response 
on the upcoming trial would win or lose points, than when they were informed that they 
could not win or lose points. This is unsurprising; presumably participants were more 
motivated to engage with the task when the accuracy of their response had consequences 
for their monetary pay-off. More importantly, performance was influenced by the type of 
distractor that was presented in the RSVP stream. As in previous experiments, accuracy was 
impaired when the target was shortly preceded by a valued distractor compared to a neutral 
distractor. This is notable because, in Experiment 4, participants already knew on every trial 
whether or not reward would be available – consequently the distractors provided no further 
information regarding reward availability, and so there was no strategic reason to attend to 
them (in fact the distractors, which signalled reward/non-reward with 80% validity, were less 
informative than was the instruction display, which signalled with 100% validity). This 
suggests that reward relationships influenced the extent to which the critical distractors 
captured participants’ attention, independently of their strategic goals or intentions. 
While statistically significant, the influence of distractor type was numerically somewhat 
smaller in Experiment 4 than in Experiments 1 and 3; this may reflect the fact that the 
distractors were weaker signals of reward (or lack of reward) in Experiment 4 (where 
distractors had 80% validity) than in prior experiments (100% validity). 
General Discussion 
Four experiments used an RSVP task to investigate the effect of value-learning on 
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nonspatial attentional capture . When a picture from the valued category (birds or cars, 
counterbalanced across participants) appeared as a distractor in the RSVP stream, it signalled 
that a correct response to the target would be rewarded and an incorrect response would be 
punished. A picture from the other, neutral category instead signalled that the response on 
this trial would not be rewarded or punished. Importantly, these valued and neutral stimuli 
were never the targets to which participants responded in order to gain reward or avoid 
punishment; they were only ever presented as task-irrelevant distractors. Nevertheless, we 
observed an influence of the learned value of these stimuli on the extent to which they 
impaired processing of the subsequent target. Specifically, valued distractors produced a 
greater impairment in accuracy than neutral distractors, both when the value relationship 
was explicitly described to participants at the outset of the study (Experiment 1), and when 
participants learned this relationship incidentally over the course of trial-by-trial experience 
(Experiment 2, learners subgroup). This influence of the critical distractors on response 
accuracy was short-lived, being most pronounced when the target followed shortly after the 
distractor. 
Notably, the pattern of poorer performance following a valued distractor than a neutral 
distractor was directly counterproductive to participants’ goal of maximising their payoff. 
Only trials with valued distractors contributed to this payoff, so poor accuracy on these trials 
translated into reduced earnings. Put another way, participants showed more accurate 
performance on (neutral) trials that ‘didn’t matter’, than on (valued) trials that did. This 
counterproductive effect suggests that the influence of learned value observed in these 
experiments reflects a mechanism over which participants have little control. Evidence in 
support of this idea comes from Experiment 3, where value-related distractors continued to 
impair performance even after we had carefully explained to participants why attending to 
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these distractors was a bad idea, and (most notably) in an extinction phase when participants 
knew that no rewards/punishments were available. Taking this idea further, Experiment 4 
demonstrated that valued distractors impaired performance even when participants knew in 
advance on every trial of the experiment whether or not reward would be available, such that 
distractors carried no useful further information about reward availability at any point. This 
suggests that attentional selection of value-related distractors does not reflect a goal-
directed, strategic process of information-gathering in this task (see Gottlieb et al., 2014). 
Instead it implies a more automatic process of attentional capture. That is, despite the 
explicit knowledge that pictures from the value-related category will never be the target and 
so should be ignored, participants implicitly continue to monitor for value-related stimuli – 
with such stimuli being particularly difficult to suppress once detected (cf. Wegner, 1994), 
reducing the availability of processing resources for subsequent perceptual processing of the 
target. 
The effect of learned value on attentional capture observed in the current experiments 
is not confounded with a potential influence of selection history (cf. Failing & Theeuwes, 
2015), since participants never selected the critical bird/car pictures as targets. Moreover, the 
fact that these critical stimuli were task-irrelevant throughout the procedure means that the 
effect of learned value is unlikely to be a carryover of a conditioned ‘attentional habit’ 
(Anderson, 2016; Le Pelley et al., 2015, 2016; Luque et al., 2017). In previous nonspatial 
studies of learned value, the critical stimuli were task-relevant in an initial training phase: 
identifying these stimuli allowed participants to obtain reward (Della Libera & Chelazzi, 2009; 
Failing & Theeuwes, 2015) or prepare for punishment (Smith et al., 2006). This reinforcement 
could drive conditioning of attentional processes to allow rapid identification of value-
related stimuli, and this conditioned attentional response may continue to be automatically 
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re-enacted whenever the relevant conditioned stimuli appear, even when they are presented 
as task-irrelevant distractors in a subsequent test phase. In contrast, attentional selection of 
value-related stimuli in the current experiments did not allow participants to gain reward or 
avoid punishment. The current findings therefore suggest that the signal-value of stimuli is 
the critical determinant of attention: the valued distractor signals the availability of valued 
outcomes, and it is this signalling relationship (or Pavlovian relationship, in conditioning 
terminology) that drives greater capture. 
In the current experiments, valued distractors signalled both that correct responses to 
the target would be rewarded, and incorrect responses would be punished. Under these 
conditions we cannot be sure whether the influence of learned value on attentional capture 
reflects an effect of learning about the stimulus’s relationship with reward, with punishment, 
or both. Based on prior findings from studies using ‘training phase – test phase’ procedures, 
it seems likely that both have an effect; that the critical issue is the motivational significance 
of the outcome that is paired with a stimulus, rather than the valence (positive versus 
negative) of that outcome (Wang et al., 2013; Wentura et al., 2014). Future research could 
investigate this in the current context by examining the likelihood of nonspatial capture by 
‘reward distractors’ (which signal that a correct response to the target will be rewarded, but 
an incorrect response will not be punished), and ‘punishment distractors’ (which signal that 
an incorrect response will be punished, but a correct response will not be rewarded). 
The influence of learned value on accuracy was rapid, being observed at a distractor–
target onset asynchrony of just 100 ms (Experiment 3). It was also short-lived: the effect of 
value decreased across lags in all experiments, and no difference in accuracy on valued 
versus neutral trials was observed at the longest lag (10 items, 1000 ms) in Experiments 1 
and 2. Prior to these experiments, we had speculated that, with a long distractor–target lag, 
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we may have observed a reversal of the effect of learned value that occurred at short lag, 
with participants now performing better on valued trials than neutral trials. Our rationale was 
that, by the time the target occurred on long-lag trials, any short-lived capture caused by the 
valued distractor may have dissipated, but a more controlled, goal-directed influence of this 
distractor may persist (cf. Bocanegra & Zeelenberg, 2009; Ciesielski, Armstrong, Zald & 
Olatunji, 2010). The valued distractor signals that reward is available and so acts as a warning 
to participants to try their best to identify the target on these trials (Bucker & Theeuwes, 
2014; Engelmann & Pessoa, 2007; Pessoa & Engelmann, 2010). However, no effect of learned 
value was observed at lag 10, with similar accuracy for valued and neutral trials. It is unclear 
how best to interpret this null finding (especially given that accuracy for all trials at lag 10 
was near ceiling, which may reduce sensitivity to observe differences). One possibility is that 
1000 ms was not long enough for the capture by the valued distractor to fully dissipate, 
counteracting any goal-directed advantage for valued trials. Alternatively, it may be the case 
that—for some reason—the valued distractor did not exert a goal-directed influence on 
participants’ vigilance. Future experiments could decide between these alternatives by using 
even longer distractor–target lags to further reduce any lingering impact of capture by the 
distractor on target identification. 
Conclusion 
In summary, we have shown that learning about the ‘signalling’ (Pavlovian) relationship 
between stimuli and valued outcomes (rewards and punishments) influences the likelihood 
that those stimuli will capture attention, even when value-related stimuli have never been the 
target that participants are required to identify or respond to. The crucial role of signal-value 
in modulating attentional capture, illustrated by the current experiments, echoes recent 
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demonstrations of its importance in modulating capture of spatial attention (Bucker, 
Belopolsky & Theeuwes, 2015; Failing, Nissens, Pearson, Le Pelley & Theeuwes, 2015; Hopf et 
al., 2015; Le Pelley et al., 2015; Mine & Saiki, 2015; Pearson et al., 2015). Our data extend this 
earlier work in two (related) ways. First, they demonstrate an influence of signal-value on 
temporal, rather than spatial, selection. This suggests that the learned signal-value of a 
stimulus results in prioritization of this stimulus in multiple ways: both through spatial 
orienting of attention, and through enhanced recruitment of nonspatial processing 
resources. Second, our data show that the effect of value-related distractors is not restricted 
to slowing search for a target; such distractors can also interfere with conscious perception 
of the target, i.e., awareness of whether a target was even presented, even when that target 
was the focus of spatial attention. 
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Footnotes 
1  Since the critical distractors in this study were physically salient colour singletons, we 
would expect them to capture attention on the basis of this physical salience in a stimulus-
driven fashion (Theeuwes, 1992). The important finding is that the likelihood of capture was 
also influenced by the learned value of distractors, independently of their physical salience; 
hence our description of value-modulated capture (as opposed to value-driven capture, 
which refers to a case in which reward drives capture by a non-physically-salient stimulus 
that would not otherwise capture attention: e.g., see Anderson, Laurent & Yantis, 2011). 
2  This procedure for identifying ‘learners’ is conservative because, if a group of participants 
have not learned the value of valued distractors, we would expect their contingency belief 
scores to be randomly distributed around a mean of zero. Hence some of these participants 
will achieve a positive score (and so be allocated to the ‘learners’ subgroup) by chance, even 
though they have not actually learned the key relationship. Overall then, data from the 
‘learners’ subgroup is likely to provide an underestimate of the true influence of learning in 
this task. In line with this idea, results of a correlational analysis reported later suggest that 
participants whose contingency belief scores provide stronger evidence of learning also tend 
to show a larger influence of learned value on performance in the RSVP task. 
3  This ANCOVA finding of a main effect of distractor was unexpected. It suggests that overall 
participants were less accurate on valued trials than on neutral trials (p = .05), i.e., an overall 
effect of learned value. However, the t-test comparing valued and neutral trials across all 
participants (reported earlier) was nonsignificant (p = .17). These two tests use the same 
data, but produce different results. The lower p-value for the ANCOVA finding seems to 
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result both from inclusion of the between-subjects subgroup factor and the inclusion of 
picture assignment as a covariate. The contribution of the covariate is shown in that 
ANCOVA gives a main effect of distractor at p = .033 even if the between-subjects subgroup 
factor is omitted. The contribution of the subgroup factor is shown in that a subgroup × 
distractor ANOVA (i.e., omitting the covariate) gives a main effect of distractor that 
approaches significance (p = .069). 
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1.  (a) Schematic of a trial from the Rapid Serial Visual Presentation (RSVP) task –
actual RSVP streams comprised 18 pictures in Experiments 1 and 2, and 12 pictures in 
Experiments 3 and 4. Participants responded to the orientation of a rotated target picture. 
This could be preceded by a critical distractor picture of a bird or car: one of these categories 
(valued distractors) signalled that correct/incorrect responses to the target would be 
rewarded/punished by gain/loss of points; the other distractor category (neutral distractors) 
signalled that responses would not be rewarded or punished. On baseline trials, no bird/car 
distractor was presented. (b) Accuracy of responses to the target in Experiment 1. Lag refers 
to the difference in serial position of the critical distractor and target in the RSVP stream (or 
between the filler item that substituted for the distractor and the target on baseline trials). 
(c) Accuracy of responses to the target in Experiment 2, averaged across all participants. (d) 
Accuracy of responses to the target for lag 2 trials in Experiment 2, for subgroups of 
participants who showed independent evidence of having learned the value of the valued 
distractor (Learners), and those who did not (Non-learners: see text for details of subgroup 
assignment). Error bars show within-subjects standard error of the mean (Cousineau, 2005).  
ns: p ≥ .10,  + p < .10,  * p < .05,  ** p < .01,  *** p < .001. (e) Scatterplot of learned value 
scores against contingency belief scores for participants of Experiment 2 (see text for 
definitions of each variable). The solid line shows the line of best fit. 
Figure 2.  Accuracy of responses to the target in the reward phase (a) and the extinction 
phase (b) of Experiment 2 as a function of distractor type and lag (see caption of Figure 1 for 
details). Error bars show within-subjects standard error of the mean (Cousineau, 2005).  ns: p 
≥ .10,  + p < .10,  * p < .05,  ** p < .01,  *** p < .001. 
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Figure 3.  (a) Schematic of a trial in Experiment 4. (b) Accuracy of responses to the target in 
Experiment 4 as a function of whether participants were pre-instructed that the trial would 
be a reward trial (Instruct reward) or a non-reward trial (Instruct non-reward), and whether 
the RSVP stream contained a distractor that was typically associated with the availability of 
reward (valued) or was not typically associated with availability of reward (neutral). Error bars 
show within-subjects standard error of the mean (Cousineau, 2005). 
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